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The Duty of Good Faith:
A Perspective on Contemporary Contract Law
Jay M. Feinman*
A duty of good faith performance inheres in every contract. Many courts get the contours
and application of the duty of good faith wrong. These courts’ restrictive approach ties
the good faith duty too closely to the express terms of the contract, requires subjective bad
faith to violate the duty, and narrowly defines the standards of conduct that good faith
requires.
This Article, presented at a symposium in honor of Charles Knapp, describes the senses
in which the courts get good faith wrong: doctrinal, historical, structural, and
political/ideological. In doing so, it applies the critical legal studies approach to the duty
of good faith and to contemporary contract law in general. The Article concludes by
suggesting the political and ideological significance of the courts’ approach to good faith
as emblematic of a classical revival in contract law.

* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law, Camden. For Chuck Knapp, who
modeled how to be a member of a scholarly community.
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One of the features of Chuck Knapp’s scholarship that has always
delighted me is how he links exhaustive and careful analysis of doctrine
and cases with broader intellectual and historical themes. In this Article,
I want to emulate that approach by looking at the ways in which many
courts apply a particular doctrine of contract law and then expand the
analysis to consider why they do that and what it means. In the more
expansive task, I return to the Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”)
movement’s examination of law and legal reasoning in general and of
contract law in particular, a project to which I contributed and with which
Knapp engaged. Although CLS is less prominent in scholarly discourse
than it used to be, now some three decades after its heyday, it still
provides the greatest insight about law available.

I. Good Faith
This Article examines the obligation of good faith, which, as the
aphorism states, is implied in every contract. Following its modern
1
reformulation by Robert Summers, the duty of good faith and fair dealing
was enshrined in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 205.
The black letter of the Restatement did not define the content of the
duty, but the comments suggested its scope:
[G]ood faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the
justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types
of conduct characterized as involving “bad faith” because they violate
2
community standards of decency, fairness, or reasonableness.

Good faith is also a requirement in the performance of every contract
3
within the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”). The 2001 amendments
to Article 1 added “observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing” to the general definition of good faith in order to supplement
“honesty in fact,” a requirement that had previously been included only
4
in the Article 2 definition.
1. See Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 195, 196 (1968). See also Robert S. Summers, The General
Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 810 (1982).
2. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a (1985).
3. U.C.C. § 1-203 (2001).
4. Compare id. § 1-201(20), with id. §§ 1-201(19), 2-103(1)(b).
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In a recent article, I argued that many courts misconceive the
5
doctrine and therefore make three errors in applying it. First, they tie
the obligation of good faith too closely to the express terms of the
contract. Some courts refuse to apply the doctrine where there is a facial
conflict beyond the asserted good faith duty and an express term of the
contract. Other courts require that the good faith obligation be applied
to an express term of the contract, holding that good faith has no
independent office except to give meaning to an express term. The Utah
Supreme Court gave a succinct and stark expression of these limitations
in Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc.:
While a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in almost every
contract, some general principles limit the scope of the covenant . . . .
First, this covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent rights
or duties to which the parties did not agree ex ante. Second, this
covenant cannot create rights and duties inconsistent with express
contractual terms. Third, this covenant cannot compel a contractual
party to exercise a contractual right “to its own detriment for the
purpose of benefitting another party to the contract.” Finally, we will
not use this covenant to achieve an outcome in harmony with the
court’s sense of justice but inconsistent with the express terms of the
6
applicable contract.

Second, courts hold that the only actionable type of breach of good
faith is an intentional or reckless violation of the standards of behavior—
that is, subjective bad faith. Under this view, dishonesty in service of
opportunism is the sole measure of bad faith. Even though they may cite
the objective standards of the Restatement, these courts require subjective
bad faith characterized by ill motive or intention. In In re Magna Cum
Latte, Inc.—for example, a bankruptcy judge summarized California law
to require, for a court to find that a party to the contract had breached its
duty of good faith,
a failure or refusal to discharge contractual responsibilities, prompted
not by an honest mistake, bad judgment or negligence but rather by a
conscious and deliberate act, which unfairly frustrates the agreed common
purposes and disappoints the reasonable expectations of the other
party
7
thereby depriving that party of the benefits of the agreement.

Third, in describing the standard for good faith, courts define the
parties’ contract and their objectives narrowly, and therefore limit the
sources and scope of the good faith obligation. One vehicle for this
narrow approach is Steven Burton’s “foregone opportunities” concept,
which limits the scope of good faith to not attempting, during the
performance of one’s contractual obligations, to recapture opportunities—

5. Jay M. Feinman, Good Faith and Reasonable Expectations, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 525 (2014).
6. Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, 104 P.3d 1226, 1240 (citations omitted) (quoting
Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., 889 P.2d 445, 457 n.13 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
7. No. 07-31814, 2007 WL 4412143, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2007) (citation omitted).
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defined in limited economic terms—foregone at the time of contracting.
The hypothetical contract approach, featured in a series of Seventh
Circuit cases by Judges Posner and Easterbrook are similar. These cases
limit good faith to “a stab at approximating the terms the parties would
have negotiated had they foreseen the circumstances that have given rise
to their dispute” in order to achieve efficiencies that the parties, as
rational maximizers, would have agreed to at the time of contracting,
such as “minimiz[ing] the costs of performance” by “reducing defensive
9
expenditures.”
Courts commit these errors because they fail to appreciate how good
faith, properly understood, gives effect to the basic principle underlying all
of contract law. As stated by Corbin in the initial section of his treatise,
“The main purpose of contract law is the realization of reasonable
10
expectations induced by promises.” The logic and purpose of the legal
enforcement of reasonable expectations is to provide security to parties
in their transactions, promote commerce, enable value-maximizing
transactions, and all of the other banal reasons discussed in a first-year
Contracts course.
The duty of good faith gives effect to the principle of reasonable
expectations in cases in which the court wishes to consider the possibility
of contractual obligation, but finds the express terms of the contract too
limited or too indistinct to form the basis of obligation. Good faith rests
on the recognition that contracting parties will incompletely specify their
obligations because of the limits of language and the inevitably finite
nature of bargaining. Therefore, in some cases, good faith determines the
extent of obligation arising from an express term by cabining the
discretion that the term vests in a party. In other cases, good faith is
further removed from an express term but protects reasonable expectations
by giving “business efficacy” to an arrangement that is “instinct with an
obligation” even though not tied to a particular contract term, as Judge
11
Cardozo suggested in cases such as Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon.
Courts err when they fail to properly apply the reasonable
expectations principle in good faith cases. First, because reasonable
expectations arise not only from express terms but also from implied
terms and the context in which the contract is made, limitations on good
faith that give too great a weight to express terms are wrong. The
obligation of good faith rests on reasonable expectations that can create
duties that go beyond those specified in the express terms of the contract,

8. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith,
94 Harv. L. Rev. 369, 373 (1980).
9. Mkt. St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991).
10. Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 1 (1952).
11. 118 N.E. 214, 214–15 (N.Y. 1917) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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including even duties that limit a party’s ability to exercise rights
apparently created by the express terms.
Second, because parties expect that their contracting partners will act
consistently, with reasonable commercial standards of behavior, requiring
subjective bad faith is wrong because it conflicts with reasonable
expectations. That is, of course, why the U.C.C. requires as elements of
good faith, both the subjective requirement of “honesty in fact” and the
objective requirement of adherence to “reasonable commercial standards
12
of fair dealing.”
Third, because reasonable expectations arise from words, conduct, and
context in complex ways—“community standards of decency, fairness or
13
reasonableness,” —it is wrong to restrict good faith by conceptions of
parties as constricted value maximizers who simply seek to prevent
opportunistic behavior or to minimize the joint costs of their relationship.
Instead, the proper standard for good faith reaches far beyond such
narrow contours to include business sense and community standards.
Accordingly, properly understood as an application of the reasonable
expectations principle in cases in which express terms are insufficient to
the task, good faith imposes broad obligations beyond those imposed by
the express terms, and those obligations include adherence to commercial
standards of reasonableness external to the express terms. Courts err when
they fail to apply those principles in applying the doctrine of good faith.

II. Doctrine
Thus, my argument is that a large number of courts get the definition
and application of the duty of good faith wrong. It is part of the law
professors’ conceit that, being removed from the press of deciding
individual cases and having the luxury of time, we can see things more
clearly than judges can, which allows us to see where they have gone astray
and lead them back to the proper path. Well, maybe. But, it is certainly
true that professors have the time, luxury, and professionally induced desire
to look at doctrinal issues in broader perspective. This Article aims to
provide that perspective by exploring in what sense the courts are wrong
and why I am right, so as to give a better picture of the duty of good faith
and its role in contemporary contract law.
The first sense in which the courts have gone wrong is in traditional
doctrinal analysis, as described in the previous section. In identifying
these errors and suggesting how to correct them, my argument is novel in
substance but familiar in form. The legal rule or standard that a party
must act in good faith is supported by a principle: the principle of
reasonable expectations. The principle of reasonable expectations, in

12. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2001).
13. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a (1985).
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turn, contains a deeper set of principles and policies, namely that courts
should enforce obligations that are implicit in parties’ agreements, parties
are assumed to act honestly and in accordance with general norms of
behavior, and so on. The scope of the principles and policies determine the
proper application of the duty to act in good faith. In applying the rule,
courts have failed to carry through the logic and purpose of the principle.
There is a proper application of that logic and purposes—my approach to
good faith—which would correct courts’ errors.
This doctrinal argument should be persuasive to courts and lawyers.
It proceeds from the common ground of the basis of contract law and
develops rules, subrules, and applications that decide cases in reasonable
ways.

III. History
A second sense in which courts get the law of good faith wrong is in
a historical sense. The restrictive approach to good faith is out of step
with the development of contract law over the last century or so. The
history of contract law in that period began with the classical conception,
which dominated legal thinking in America from about 1870 to 1920.
Thereafter, classical law was subjected to sustained critique, which, by
the 1970s, produced a new body of contract law conventionally known as
14
“neoclassical.” Courts err when they fail to fully incorporate neoclassical
principles into their analysis of good faith.
Classical contract law conceived of contract as a field of private
ordering in which parties created their own law by making promises and
consenting to agreements, in contrast to public law, which involved the
imposition of legal obligations by the state. This focus on consent was
grounded in a conception of the social world as composed of independent,
freedom-seeking individuals, each of whom avidly pursued his own selfinterest. The job of courts, accordingly, was to enforce the rights created by
the parties’ contracts and to refrain from imposing obligation where it had
not been assumed. This enforcement took place through the application of
abstract, formal rules that defined the elements that give rise to a contract
right. Faithful and mechanical application of these rules was thought to
protect parties’ autonomy from judicial invasion and enable individuals to
anticipate the legal consequences of their conduct and calculate the extent
15
to which particular contracts might serve their self-interest.

14. See generally Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law,
28 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Feinman, Un-Making Law]; Jay M. Feinman, Critical
Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 829 (1983) [hereinafter Feinman, Critical Approaches].
See also Peter Gabel & Jay M. Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in The Politics of Law: A
Progressive Critique 497 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
15. Feinman, Un-Making Law, supra note 14, at 4–7.
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The critique of classical contract law, which began with Corbin and
Llewellyn and extended through their successors in American legal
realism and beyond, demonstrated that contract law does not arise from
the consent of the parties in a way that is self-executing. Instead, contract
law is like tort law and judicial action is like legislative action, in that all
necessarily involve public policy judgments. Those judgments must
account for the fact that although people have individual desires and
interests, they are not just freedom-seeking isolates; rather, they are
social beings with the responsibilities and benefits that come from living
in a collective society. Even in the world of commerce, exchange occurs
in the context of relationships, relationships that are governed by social
norms and law as much as or more than by consent. In such a world, the
inadequacy of language and the complexity of facts preclude the
16
possibility of a formal, rule-based body of doctrine.
The body of contract law that developed by the 1970s—the law of
the U.C.C. and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the law described
17
in the Farnsworth and Calamari and Perillo treatises —is appropriately
described as “neoclassical” because the elements of the critique supplement
but do not supplant the classical elements. In the neoclassical conception,
private parties act out of economic self-interest but they also recognize
the legitimacy of commercial norms that do not always accord with their
immediate self-interest. They consent to agreements that create and define
the scope of their obligations, but agreements are founded only partly on
consent; obligations also arise from raising expectations and inducing
reliance in the absence of subjective assent. Parties specify the terms of their
agreements, but incompletely, so their agreements require interpretation
18
and gap filling by a variety of doctrines. And so on.
This historical account restates the doctrinal argument in a different
perspective. The error courts commit in restricting good faith is not simply
an error in applying principle to rule, but also denies the historical process
that has shaped modern contract law. Good faith in neoclassical law is an
important supplementary and gap-filling doctrine, and courts need to
recognize its value and expansive contours. Parties rarely specify in their
agreements that they must observe honesty in fact and reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing, to use the U.C.C.’s terms, but the
obligation to do so is generally if implicitly understood. Performance and
even termination provisions vest parties with discretion but do not define
all of the limits on that discretion; and good faith provides limits beyond
those specified. Even beyond filling out the express terms of the contract,
16. Id. at 9–10.
17. See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts (3d ed. 2004); John D.
Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, Calamari and Perillo on Contracts (6th ed. 2009).
18. Feinman, Un-Making Law, supra note 14, at 13–15; Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract
Theory, 58 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 1283, 1287–89 (1990).
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good faith instantiates the obligation to act in accordance with the norms
of business.

IV. Structure
A third sense in which the courts get good faith wrong becomes
apparent by translating the historical account into a structural account of
the nature of contract law. From this perspective, courts err in narrowly
applying good faith by denying something fundamental about the
purpose and nature of contract law.
The structural account translates the historical narrative of classicism/
critique/neoclassicism into a conflict between two images or visions of
19
contract law. Much of the problem of classicism, according to the critique,
was excess, not error. Furthering individual interests is important, but so
is promoting communal values. Rules are desirable but not always
realizable so they must be leavened with standards. Private ordering
through the market is valuable but requires correction by state regulation.
And so on. Therefore, it is necessary to determine appropriate rules and
achieve correct results, given both sets of principles.
In conventional terms, the classical model is referred to as
“individualist,” and the principles of the critique “collectivist,” “social,”
or, even in some versions, “communitarian.” Individualist principles
express the importance of the individual, the value of choice, and the
importance of private ordering with limited legal intervention only to
protect recognized and established rights. Collectivist principles embody
the importance of community, the value of responsibility, and the role of
law in the service of public values.
Just as the models of classicism and critique (and neoclassical law,
for that matter) are somewhat stylized and abstracted, so, too, are the
models of individualism and collectivism. These are interpretive
understandings of large bodies of discourse. Each of the models coheres,
in the sense that their elements stick together, but the elements are not
logically deduced from fundamental principles. In fact, both models share
important elements and techniques, and every legal actor believes in, and
20
from time to time will express, elements of each. No one believes, for
example, that the needs of the many always outweigh the needs of the
few or the one, or, vice versa, that needs of an individual always outweigh
21
the needs of the community.

19. See generally Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, supra note 18; Feinman, Critical
Approaches, supra note 14, at 839–44.
20. See Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication {FIN DE SIÈCLE} 49 (1997) [hereinafter
Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication]; Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries,
28 Buff. L. Rev. 209, 211–13 (1979) [hereinafter Kennedy, Structure of Blackstone].
21. Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, supra note 20, at 46–50.
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A few physical metaphors may be helpful. One way to envision
contract law is through a core and periphery model. The critique of
classical law did not argue that the individualist core of classical thought
was false, but only that it was incomplete. Individualism, the power of
consent, the importance of private ordering, and the desire for formal
adjudication are important values in American society; the essence of the
critique was that these values were not the whole story. Therefore,
contract law maintains an individualist core with a periphery of
collectivism.
In the core/periphery model, the explicit terms of an agreement
constitute the core of contractual obligation, but explicit terms are never
the entirety of the parties’ agreement. Some things are understood though
left unsaid, some things would be agreed to if considered, and some
things are built in through the background of context and norms that
envelop any agreement. Under this conception, the errors courts make in
the constricted good faith cases are to understate or ignore entirely the
presence of the periphery.
A different and more expansive way to envision contract law is as a
balance between elements of individualism and elements of collectivism.
The balance can shift from time to time and from issue to issue so one
side can outweigh but should never overwhelm the other. In the balance
metaphor, the values of private ordering and enforcing only the terms
the parties have chosen to include in their agreement need to be balanced
against the recognition that agreements are more broadly constituted
than the express terms reveal. Moreover, parties should, in any event, be
held to community standards of reasonableness. Courts err when they tip
the balance too far in the individualist direction. From this perspective,
courts err in the good faith cases by tipping the scales too far in favor of
express terms and against standards of reasonableness.
The structural account suggests that courts get good faith wrong in
favoring individualist values over collectivist values when defining and
applying good faith. That there is a wrong answer suggests that there is a
right answer and a method for distinguishing between right and wrong.
Contemporary law suggests that in fact, there is a method for resolving
conflicts, whether drawing the boundary between core and periphery or
weighing values in achieving a proper balance. Rules are formulated and
cases decided using a mix of deductive reasoning and policy analysis.
Particular rules and results may be controversial and disputed, but there
is general agreement that courts are capable of formulating rules and
deciding cases in a relatively noncontroversial way; when they get the
results wrong, as they sometimes do, it is only because they have applied
the common law method improperly, not that the method itself is flawed.
Therefore, the error of courts in the good faith cases is little more than
an error in doctrinal analysis writ large.
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The problem with this analysis, from the critical perspective, is that
22
it ignores the indeterminacy critique. In the critical perspective,
doctrine is radically indeterminate. A single principle or policy can be
used to support opposite conclusions, and a principle or policy can
23
typically be countered by a different principle or policy.
Without restating the entire indeterminacy critique in all its versions
here, think about reasonable expectations. The definition of reasonable
expectations is in part a normative process. How do we tell what
expectations are reasonable, which means what expectations should be
reasonable? In defining what expectations are reasonable, when should
courts favor individualist values or collectivist norms? Having selected
one set of values, in which direction do they lead? And in attempting to
balance the values, what is the measure that enables the court to do so
objectively? Corbin attempted to provide an answer:
It must not be supposed that contract problems have been solved by
the dictum that expectations must be “reasonable.” Reasonableness is
no more absolute in character than is justice or morality. Like them, it
is an expression of the customs and mores of men—the customs and
mores that are themselves complex, variable with time and place,
24
inconsistent and contradictory.

Knapp attacked the CLS indeterminacy critique, suggesting that this
way of thinking about contract law and associated work proposing a
relational contract theory is “no more ‘determinate’ than the contract
25
law we have now . . . a scant improvement.” Yes and no. “Yes,” in that
if the indeterminacy critique is correct, these new approaches would not
be capable of giving more certain results in particular cases. That is
exactly the point of the critique, and if it is correct, that is just the way
the world is. But “no” in that the lack of determinacy does not mean a
26
lack of insight. It is in that perspective that there is a political or
ideological sense in which the courts are wrong in the good faith cases.
The errors courts commit in restricting the application of good faith are
not isolated or random. Instead, they are part of a much broader
approach to restricting contract law over the past quarter century—a
classical revival in contract law.

22. The same problem is present in neoclassical law’s incorporation of the critique as a corrective
to neoclassicism. See Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 14, at 846–47.
23. The literature is voluminous. For concise statements, see, for example, Feinman, The Significance
of Contract Theory, supra note 18, at 1312–13; John Henry Schlegel, Of Duncan, Peter, and Thomas
Kuhn, 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1061, 1065 (2000); Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property,
40 Stan. L. Rev. 611, 624 n.40 (1988).
24. Corbin, supra note 10, at 2.
25. Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 Hastings L.J.
1191, 1233 (1998).
26. The CLS approach has “done much in this postmodern period to nudge the complacent rest
of us to at least imagine, if only briefly, the possibility of better worlds than this one.” Id. at 1232.
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The core principle of the classical revival restores the emphasis on
contract law to private law, both to enhance personal autonomy and to
facilitate the operation of the unfettered market as the essential social
institution. Richard Epstein summed up the approach:
[Contract] law can facilitate (not compel, but facilitate) sizable
productive interactions which will continue to expand over time and
transactions until they embrace all individuals who possess the
minimum capacity to engage in contracting at all. The system goes
forward in a benevolent fashion because the exchanges are mutually
beneficial. . . . The background knowledge of the uniform incentives
moving self-interested parties is a more reliable guide to their interests
27
than any public vetting of their deal.

Therefore, the role of contract law is to enforce the bargains that parties
have made, not extend obligation beyond those bargains or bring public
values such as commercial reasonableness to bear in assessing their
validity. Formality reigns, both in the formulation of rules of contract law
and in the preference for clear expressions in parties’ contracts. Epstein
again (and one can hardly tell when Epstein is being hyperbolic): “For all
its minor differences, and with a little refurbishing at the edges, we could
do as well with the Roman law of contract as we do with any modern
system dedicated to the principle of freedom of contract, as our system
28
too often is not.” The classical revival resonates throughout contract
law. I offer only a few examples, about each of which Knapp has written.
Standard form contracts in paper and electronic form are, of course,
the dominant mode of contracting today. To use Knapp’s phrase, the
classical revival aims to treat form contracts as “sacred cows” rather than
29
“dangerous animals, likely to do harm unless confined and tamed.”
Through such contracts, dominant contracting parties bind their customers
without meaningful assent, notice, or opportunity to pursue other terms.
For example, a forum-selection clause included in fine print as the eighth
of twenty-five numbered paragraphs on a cruise line ticket sent to the
passenger only after the passenger had made a nonrefundable payment
30
constitutes assent, according to the Supreme Court. Ordering a computer
system and paying for it with a credit card does not constitute a purchase
where a piece of paper shipped in the box with the computer specifies
31
otherwise, according to the Seventh Circuit. As Stewart Macaulay

27. Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 78–79 (1995).
28. Id. at 327.
29. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 Fordham
L. Rev. 761, 789 (2002).
30. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). See Charles L. Knapp, Contract Law
Walks the Plank: Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 12 Nev. L.J. 553, 554 (2012).
31. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 1997); see also ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1446, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
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explained the theory of these cases, “misrepresentation is the oil that
32
lubricates capitalism.”
At the other end of the contracting process, the point of dispute, the
classical revival’s reverence for expressed assent and disdain for judicial
intervention has resulted in the routine enforcement of contact terms that
33
supplant the legal system as a dispute resolution mechanism. Predispute,
dominant parties use mandatory arbitration clauses to deny consumers
effective review of the form, substance, or performance of their contracts,
34
as in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute. The selection of arbitration to
the exclusion of litigation, the designation of an arbitral forum, and any
limitations on the scope of arbitration are routinely enforced, and the
possibility of examining arbitration clauses for unconscionability or
reviewing the results or an arbitration for error or worse have all but
disappeared.
In between those chronological poles, similar effects are evident in
other doctrines. In neoclassical law, promissory estoppel offered the
promise of a means of subverting the formal requirements of traditional
contract law in many cases, making enforceable a promise on which
someone relied, even if the promise did not meet the traditional standards
35
for forming a contract. The classical revival’s emphasis on formality
caused this to be “the revolution that wasn’t,” as characterized by Sidney
36
DeLong. As with mandatory arbitration clauses, sophisticated parties
use the limits of the doctrine as a way of avoiding responsibility for the
37
promises they have made.
Courts’ restrictive approach to good faith is of a piece with these
developments. Standard form contracts enable dominant parties to
dictate terms, and the decline of reliance-based liability allows them to
deny responsibility for promises outside written contracts. Restrictive
applications of good faith do the same, limiting obligations to express
terms and precluding liability for expectations raised outside of the express

32. The Gateway Thread: AALS Contracts Listserv, 16 Touro L. Rev. 1147, 1149 (2000).
33. See generally Knapp, supra note 29; Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory
Arbitration: Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 San Diego L. Rev. 609 (2009).
34. See text accompanying note 30.
35. For a review, see generally Knapp, supra note 25.
36. Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial Promissory
Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 943, 943.
37. For example, DeLong catalogued examples of employer statements that do not rise to the
level of promises, including:
“You will be here until you retire”; . . . “You will not have to be concerned
about job security because you have a job here as long as you want or until you
retire”; . . . “You will have a job until you retire; we’ll have you for the next
twelve years”; “Your position will never be taken away and you can have it as
long as you want it”; “You have full-time, permanent employment”; “I don’t see
a problem with you working until you are sixty-five.”
Id. at 1004–05.
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terms. Mandatory arbitration clauses remove contract cases from the
sphere of public lawmaking through adjudication, and narrowing good
faith focuses on the private and the internal, rather than the public and
the objective.

V. Ideology and Politics
The restrictive approach to good faith is part of a classical revival in
contract law, and that movement is part of a transformation in private
38
law generally. In tort law, the classical revival reinstates traditional
notions of fault and corrective justice in place of the neoclassical
emphasis on compensation and collective justice. Personal responsibility
is seen as a focus on the conduct of the injured and not the wrongdoing
of injurers, with a goal of unburdening market entrepreneurs. The
optimal balance of safety and injury is to be achieved through market
forces rather than through legal liability. As a result, the generalization
of negligence that characterized the neoclassical expansion of tort law is
abandoned and new immunities and special liability rules are established,
products liability abandons the move toward strict liability in favor of a
pure negligence regime, and damages are cut back. In property law, the
notion that property constitutes “a natural and unique set of
entitlements” replaces the idea the “property serves human values.”
Most notably, the law of takings has expanded as a protection against
government action that limits individual property rights in pursuit of the
collective good.
There is a puzzle here. The classical revival restates, in modern
guise, the position of classical law, a position that was critiqued—proven
wrong—by a half century or more of scholarship and lawmaking. In 1943,
Robert Hale explained why freedom of contract was a bankrupt concept,
39
yet the concept has become a rallying cry in the new generation. Corbin,
Llewellyn, Hohfeld, Hale, and other scholars, and Cardozo, Traynor, and
other judges demonstrated the emptiness of formalism so only a
sophisticated mix of policy and doctrine could address the complexities
of commercial transactions, yet Epstein is taken seriously in arguing that
40
there are “Simple Rules for A Complex World.” How is this possible?
The answer is ideological, which is to say it is political, and that
demonstrates that the courts are wrong in the good faith cases in a much
deeper sense than ignoring history or slighting collectivist values. The
classical revival of contract law is part of the campaign by political

38. See Feinman, Un-Making Law, supra note 14, at 1–2.
39. See generally Robert Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, 22 Colum. L.
Rev. 209, 214 (1922).
40. Epstein, supra note 27, at 78–79.
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conservatives and business interests to reshape American government,
41
law, and society.
Ronald Reagan proclaimed the principal item on the agenda of this
campaign most baldly in his first inaugural address: “Government is not
42
the solution to our problems; government is the problem.” Government
is the problem because it interferes with individual freedom, particularly
the individual freedom to pursue self-interest through the market. If
government is the problem, then the solution is to reduce the reach of
government, including the part of government that exercises authority
through the common law. The ability to contract and to have obligation
limited to the contracts one has made are essential conditions of
freedom, so the role of courts must be to enforce express terms, not to
add to them or to assess their reasonableness through doctrines such as
43
good faith.
With this emphasis on personal freedom, contract law becomes
envisioned as nonpolitical. It lies within the realm of corrective justice,
righting wrongs between individuals according to objective principles of
law, as contrasted with the political choices made in electoral politics and
in legislation. And back to CLS, in the view of which this position is
nonsense of a particularly pernicious kind. The nonsense is that contract
law is essentially non-ideological. In fact, contract law, like all law, is
deeply political and ideological. The most pernicious error of courts in the
good faith cases, therefore, is the attempt to remove law from the realm
of policy and politics.

41. See Feinman, Un-Making Law, supra note 14, at 56.
42. John B. Judis & Ruy Teixeira, The Emerging Democratic Majority 151–52 (2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
43. “Like other aspects of personal autonomy, [freedom of contract] is too easily smothered by
government officials eager to tell us what’s best for us.” Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int’l, Inc., 872 F.2d
312, 316 (9th Cir. 1989).

